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Due to its eﬃciency, symmetric key cryptography is very attractive in sensor networks. A number of key predistribution schemes
have been proposed, but the scalability is often constrained by the unavailability of topology information before deployment and
the limited storage budget within sensors. To overcome this problem, three in-situ key establishment schemes, SBK, LKE, and
iPAK, have been proposed. These schemes require no preloaded keying information but let sensors compute pairwise keys after
deployment. In this paper, we propose an in-situ key establishment framework of which iPAK, SBK, and LKE represent diﬀerent
instantiations. We further compare the performance of these schemes in terms of scalability, connectivity, storage, and resilience.
Our simulation results indicate that all the three schemes scale well to large sensor networks. We also notice that SBK outperforms
LKE and LKE outperforms iPAK with respect to topology adaptability. Finally, observing that iPAK, SBK, and LKE all rely on the
key space models that involve computationally intensive modular operations, we propose an improvement that rely on random
keys that can be easily computed from a secure pseudorandom function. This new approach requires no computation overhead at
regular worker sensors, therefore has a high potential to conserve the network resource.
Copyright © 2009 Yingchang Xiang et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution
License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly
cited.
1. Introduction
Secure communication is a critical requirement for many
sensor network applications. Nevertheless, the constrained
capabilities of smart sensors (battery supply, CPU, memory,
etc.) and the harsh deployment environment of a sensor
network (infrastructureless, wireless, ad hoc, etc.) make this
problem very challenging. A secure sensor network requires
a “sound” key establishment scheme that should be easily
realized by individual sensors, should be localized to scale
well to large sensor networks, should require small amount of
space for keying information storage, and should be resilient
against node capture attacks.
Symmetric key cryptography is attractive and applicable
in sensor networks because it is computationally eﬃcient. As
reported by Carman et. al [1], a middle-ranged processor
such as the Motorola MC68328 “DragonBall” consumes
42 mJ (840 mJ) for RSA encryption (digital signature) and
0.104 mJ for AES when the key size for both cases is 1024 bits.
Therefore establishing a shared key for pairwise communica-
tion becomes a central problem for sensor network security
research. Ever since the pioneer work on key predistribution
by Eschenauer and Gligor [2] in the year 2002, a variety of
key establishment schemes have been reported, as illustrated
in Figure 1.
Key predistribution is motivated by the observation that
no topology information is available before deployment. The
two extreme cases are the single master key scheme, which
preloads a master key to all sensors, and the all pairwise
keys scheme, which preloads a unique key for each pair
of sensors. The first one is weak in resilience while the
second one has a high storage overhead. Other than these
two extreme cases there exist a number of probabilistic-
based key predistribution schemes [2–11], which attract
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Figure 1: Existing Key Establishment Schemes - A Taxonomy.
most of the research interests in securing sensor networks.
The probabilistic-based schemes require each sensor to
preload keying information such that two neighboring
sensors compute a shared key after exchanging part of the
stored information after deployment. Generally speaking,
the larger the amount of keying information stored within
each sensor, the better the connectivity of the key-sharing
graph, the higher the computation and communication
overheads. A major drawback of the schemes in this category
is the storage space wastage since a large amount of keying
information may never be utilized during the lifetime of a
sensor. Consequently, the scalability of key predistribution
is poor, since the amount of required security information
to be preloaded increases with the network size. Further-
more, many of the probabilistic-based approaches bear poor
resilience as the compromise of any sensors could release the
pairwise key used to protect the communications between
two uncompromised sensors. In summary, probabilistic-
based key predistribution could not achieve good perfor-
mance in terms of scalability, storage overhead, key-sharing
probability, and resilience simultaneously.
Recently, three in-situ key establishment schemes, iPAK
[12], SBK [13] and LKE [14], have been proposed for
the purpose of overcoming all the problems faced by key
predistribution. Schemes in this category require no keying
information to be predistributed, while sensors compute
shared keys with their neighbors after deployment. The basic
idea is to utilize a small number of service sensors as sacrifices
for disseminating keying information to worker sensors in
the vicinity. Worker sensors are in charge of normal network
operations such as sensing and reporting. Two worker
sensors can derive a common key once they obtain keying
information from the same service sensor. In this paper, we
first propose the in-situ key establishment framework, of
which iPAK, SBK, and LKE represent diﬀerent instantiations.
Then we report our comparison study on the performance
of these three schemes in terms of scalability, connectivity,
storage overhead and resilience. Our results indicate that all
the three in-situ schemes scale well to large sensor networks
as they require only local information. Furthermore, we also
notice that SBK outperforms LKE and LKE outperforms
iPAK with respect to topology adaptability. Finally, observing
that iPAK, SBK, and LKE all rely on the key space models
that involve intensive computation overhead, we propose an
improvement that rely on random keys that could be easily
generated by a secure pseudorandom function.
This paper is organized as follows. Major key predistri-
bution schemes are summarized in Section 2. Preliminaries,
models, and assumptions are sketched in Section 3. The in-
situ key establishment framework is introduced in Section 4,
and the three instantiations are outlined in Section 5.
Performance evaluation and comparison study are reported
in Section 6. Finally, we summarize our work and discuss the
future research in Section 7.
2. Related Work: Key Predistribution
In this section, major related works on key predistribution
are summarized and compared. We refer the readers to [10,
15] for a more comprehensive literature survey.
The basic random keys scheme is proposed by Eschenauer
and Gligor in [2], in which a large key pool K is computed
oﬄine and each sensor picks m keys randomly from K
without replacement before deployment. Two sensors can
establish a shared key as long as they have at least one key
in common. To enhance the security of the basic scheme in
against small-scale attacks, Chan et al. [3] propose the q-
composite keys scheme in which q > 1 number of common
keys are required for two nodes to establish a shared key.
This scheme performs worse in resilience when the number
of compromised sensors is large.
In these two schemes [2, 3], increasing the number of
compromised sensors increases the percentage of compro-
mised links shared by uncompromised sensors. To overcome
this problem, in the same work Chan et al. [3] propose to
boost up a unique key for each link through multi-path
enhancement. For the same purpose, Zhu et al. [16] propose
to utilize multiple logic paths. To improve the eﬃciency of
key discovery in [2, 3], which is realized by exchanging the
identifiers of the stored keys, or by a challenge-response
procedure, Zhu et al. [16] propose an approach based on
the pseudo-random key generator seeded by the node id.
Each sensor computes the key identifiers and preloads the
corresponding keys based on its unique id. Two sensors can
determine whether they have a common key based on their
ids only. Note that this procedure does not improve the
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security of the key discovery procedure since an attacker
can still Figure out the key identifiers as long as the
algorithm is available. Further, a smart attacker can easily
beat the pseudo-random key generator to compromise the
network faster [17]. Actually for smart attackers, challenge-
response is an eﬀective way for key discovery but it is too
computationally intensive. Di Pietro et al. [17] propose a
pseudo-random key predeployment scheme that supports a
key discovery procedure that is as eﬃcient as the pseudo-
random key generator [16] and as secure as challenge-
response.
To improve the resilience of the random keys scheme in
against node capture attacks, random pairwise keys schemes
have been proposed [3, 4], in which a key is shared by two
sensors only. These schemes have good resilience against
node capture attacks since the compromise of a sensor
only aﬀects the links incident to that sensor. The diﬀerence
between [3] and [4] is that sensors in [3] are paired based on
ids while in [4] are on virtual grid locations. Similar to the
random keys schemes, random pairwise keys schemes do not
scale well to large sensor networks. Neither do they have good
key-sharing probability due to the conflict between the high
keying storage redundancy requirement and the memory
constraint.
To improve the scalability of the random keys schemes,
two random key spaces schemes [5, 7] have been proposed
independently at ACM CCS 2003. These two works are
similar in nature, except that they apply diﬀerent key space
models, which will be summarized in Subsection 3.1. Each
sensor preloads several keying shares, with each belonging to
one key space. Two sensors can establish a shared key if they
have keying information from the same key space. References
[7] also proposes to assign one key space to each row or each
column of a virtual grid. A sensor residing at a grid point
receives keying information from exactly two key spaces. This
realization involves more number of key spaces. Note that
these random key spaces schemes also improve resilience
and key-sharing probability because more key spaces are
available, and because two sensors compute a unique key
within one key space for their shared links.
Compared to the works mentioned above, group-based
schemes [6, 8, 9, 11] have the best performance in scalability,
key-sharing probability, storage, and resilience due to the
relatively less randomness involved in these key predistri-
bution schemes. Du et al. scheme [6] is the first to apply
the group concept, in which sensors are grouped before
deployment and each group is dropped at one deployment
point. Correspondingly, a large key pool K is divided
into subkey spaces, with each associated with one group
of sensors. Subkey spaces overlap if the corresponding
deployment points are adjacent. Such a scheme ensures
that close-by sensors have a higher chance to establish a
pairwise key directly. But the strong assumption on the
deployment knowledge (static deployment point) renders it
impractical for many applications. Also relying on deploy-
ment knowledge, the scheme proposed by Yu and Guan
in [9] significantly reduces the number of potential groups
from which neighbors of each node may come, yet still
achieves almost perfect key-sharing probability with low
storage overhead. Two similar works [8, 11] have been
proposed at ACM Wise 2005 independently. In [8], sensors
are equally partitioned based on ids into disjoint deployment
groups and disjoint cross groups. Each sensor resides in
exactly one deployment group and one cross group. Sensors
within the same group can establish shared keys based on
any of the key establishment schemes mentioned above
[2–4, 18, 19]. In [11], the deployment groups and cross
groups are defined diﬀerently and each sensor may reside in
more than two groups. Note that these two schemes inherit
many nice features of [6], but release the strong topology
assumption adopted by [6]. A major drawback of these
schemes is the high communication overhead when path
keys are sought to establish shared keys between neighboring
sensors.
Even with these eﬀorts, the shared key establishment
problem still has not been completely solved yet. As claimed
by [20, 21], the performance is still constrained by the
conflict between the desired probability to construct shared
keys for communicating parties and the resilience against
node capture attacks, under a given capacity for keying
information storage in each sensor. Researchers have been
actively working toward this to minimize the randomness
[22, 23] in the key predistribution schemes. Due to space
limitations, we could not cover all of them thoroughly.
Interested readers are referred to a recent survey [15] and the
references therein.
Architectures consisting of base stations for key man-
agement have been considered in [24] and [25], which
rely on base stations to establish and update diﬀerent
types of keys. In [1], Carman et al. apply various key
management schemes on diﬀerent hardware platforms and
evaluate their performance in terms of energy consumption,
for and so forth. Authentication in sensor networks has been
considered in [24–26], and so forth.
The three in-situ key establishment schemes [12–14]
are radically diﬀerent from all those mentioned above.
They rely on service sensors to facilitate pairwise key
establishment between worker sensors after deployment. The
service sensors could be predetermined [12], or self-elected
based on some probability [13] or location information
[14]. Each service sensor carries or computes a key space
and distributes a unique piece of keying information to
each associated worker sensor in its neighborhood via a
computationally asymmetric secure channel. Two worker
sensors are able to compute a pairwise key if they obtain
keying information from the same key space. As verified
by our simulation study in Section 6, in-situ schemes
can simultaneously achieve good performance in terms of
scalability, storage overhead, key-sharing probability, and
resilience.
3. Preliminaries, Models, and Assumptions
3.1. Key Space Models. The two key space models for est-
ablishing pairwise keys, one is polynomial-based [19] and
the other is matrix-based [18], have been tailored for sensor
networks at [7] and [5], respectively. These two models are
similar in nature.
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The polynomial-based key space utilizes a bivariate λ-
degree polynomial f (x, y) = f (y, x) = ∑λi, j=0ai jx j y j over
a finite field Fq, where q is a large prime number (q must
be large enough to accommodate a cryptographic key) .
By pluging in the id of a sensor, we obtain the keying
information (called a polynomial share) allocated to that
sensor. For example, sensor i receives f (i, y) as its keying
information. Therefore two sensors knowing each other’s id
can compute a shared key from their keying information as
f (x, y) = f (y, x). For the generation of a polynomial-based
key space f (x, y), we refer the readers to [19].
The matrix-based key space utilizes a (λ + 1) × (λ + 1)
public matrix (Note that G can contain more than (λ + 1)
columns.) G and a (λ + 1) × (λ + 1) private matrix D over a
finite field GF(q), where q is a prime that is large enough
to accommodate a cryptographic key. We require D to be
symmetric. Let A = (D ·G)T . Since D is symmetric, A · G
is symmetric too. If we let K = A · G, we have ki j = kji,
where ki j is the element at the ith row and the jth column
of K , i, j = 1, 2, . . . , λ + 1. Therefore if a sensor knows a row
of A, say row i, and a column of G, say column j, then the
sensor can compute ki j . Based on this observation, we can
allocate to sensor i a keying share containing the ith row of
A and the ith column of G, such that two sensors i and j can
compute their shared key ki j by exchanging the columns of
G in their keying information. We call (D,G) a matrix-based
key space, whose generation has been well-documented by
[18] and further by [5].
Both key spaces are λ-collusion-resistent [18, 19]. In
other words, as long as no more than λ sensors receiving
keying information from the same key space release their
stored keying shares to an attacker, the key space remains
perfectly secure. Note that it is interesting to observe that the
storage space required by a keying share from either key space
at a sensor can be very close ((λ+1)·log q for the polynomial-
based key space [19] and (λ + 2)·log q for the matrix-based
key space [18]) for the same λ, as long as the public matrix G
is carefully designed. For example, [5] proposes to employ a
Vandermonde matrix over GF(q) for G, such that a keying
share contains one row of A and the seed element of the
corresponding column in G. However, the column of G in
a keying share must be restored when needed, resulting in
(λ− 1) modular multiplications.
Note that iPAK, SBK and LKE work with both key space
models. In these schemes, service sensors need to generate
or to be preloaded with a key space and then distribute to
each worker sensor a keying share. Two worker sensors can
establish a shared key as long as they have keying information
from the same key space. Note that for a polynomial-based
key space, two sensors need to exchange their ids while for a
matrix-based key space, they need to exchange the columns
(or the seeds of the corresponding columns) of G in their
keying shares.
3.2. Rabin’s Public Cryptosystem. Rabin’s scheme [27] is a
public cryptosystem, which is adopted by the in-situ key
establishment schemes to set up a computationally asymmet-
ric secure channel through which keying information can be
delivered from a service sensor to a worker sensor.
3.2.1. Key Generation. Choose two large distinct primes p
and q such that p ≡ q ≡ 3 mod 4. (p, q) is the private key
while n = p · q is the public key.
3.2.2. Encryption. For the encryption, only the public key n
is needed. Let Pl be the plain text that is represented as an
integer in Zn. Then the cipher text c = P2l mod n.
3.2.3. Decryption. Since p ≡ q ≡ 3 mod 4, we have
mp = cp+1/4 mod p,
mq = cq+1/4 mod q.
(1)
By applying the extended Euclidean algorithm, yp and yq can
be computed such that yp · p + yq · q = 1.
From the Chinese remainder theorem, four square roots
+r, −r, +s,−s can be obtained:
r =
(
yp · p ·mq + yq · q ·mp
)
mod n
−r = n− r
s =
(
yp · p ·mq − yq · q ·mp
)
mod n
−s = n− s.
(2)
Note that Rabin’s encryption [27] requires only one
squaring, which is several hundreds of times faster than
RSA. However, its decryption time is comparable to RSA.
The security of Rabin’s scheme is based on the factorization
of large numbers; thus, it is comparable to that of RSA
too. Since Rabin’s decryption produces three false results in
addition to the correct plain text, a prespecified redundancy,
a bit string R, is appended to the plain text before encryption
for ambiguity resolution.
3.3. Network Model and Security Assumptions. We consider
a large-scale sensor network with nodes dropped over the
deployment region through vehicles such as aircrafts. There-
fore no topology information is available before deployment.
Sensors are classified as either worker nodes or service nodes.
Worker sensors are in charge of sensing and reporting
data, and thus are expected to operate for a long time.
Service sensors take care of key space generation and
keying information dissemination to assist in bootstrapping
pairwise keys among worker sensors. They may die early
due to depleted energy resulted from high workload in the
bootstrapping procedure. In this sense, they are sacrifices.
Nevertheless, we assume service sensors are able to survive
the bootstrapping procedure.
In our consideration, sensors are not tamper resistant.
The compromise or capture of a sensor releases all its security
information to the attacker. Nevertheless, a sensor deployed
in a hostile environment must be designed to survive at
least a short interval longer than the key bootstrapping
procedure when captured by an adversary; otherwise, the
whole network can be easily taken over by the opponent [28].
We further assume that a cryptographically secure key
k0 is preloaded to all sensors such that all communications
in the key establishment procedure can be protected by a
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popular symmetric cryptosystem such as AES or Triple-
DES. Therefore k0 is adopted mainly to protect against
false sensor injection attacks, and any node deployed by
an adversary can be excluded from key establishment. Note
that k0 is strong enough such that it is almost impossible
for an adversary to recover it before the key establishment
procedure is complete, and the release of k0 after the
key establishment procedure does not negatively aﬀect the
security of the in-situ key establishment schemes since
all sensitive information involved in the key establishment
procedure is protected via a diﬀerent technique. All sensors
should remove their stored keying information (k0 and/or
the key space/pool) at the end of the key bootstrapping
procedure.
4. The In-Situ Key Establishment Framework
Compared to the predistribution schemes, in-situ key estab-
lishment schemes distribute keying information for shared
key computation after deployment.
All the in-situ key establishment contains three phases:
service node determination and key space construction, service
node association and keying information acquisition, and
shared key derivation. iPAK, SBK, and LKE mainly diﬀer
from each other in the first phase, which will be detailed
afterwards. Now we sketch the framework for in-situ key
establishment in sensor networks.
4.1. Service Node Determination and Key Space Construc-
tion. In the first phase, service nodes are either prese-
lected (in iPAK[12]), or self-elected with some probabil-
ity (in SBK[13]) or based on sensors’ physical location
(in LKE[14]). A λ-collusion resistent key space (either
polynomial-based [19] or matrix-based [18]) is allocated to
[12] or generated by [13, 14] each service sensor.
Before deployment, each sensor randomly picks up two
primes p and q from a pool of large primes without
replacement. The prime pool is precomputed by high-
performance facilities, which is out of the scope of this paper.
Primes p and q will be used to form the private key such that
Rabin’s public cryptosystem [27] can be applied to establish
a secure channel for disseminating keying information in the
second phase.
4.2. Service Node Association and Keying Information Acqui-
sition. Once a service sensor finishes the key space con-
struction, it broadcasts a beacon message notifying others
of its existence after a random delay. A worker node
receiving the beacon will acquire keying information from
the service sensor through a secure channel established
based on Rabin’s cryptosystem between the two nodes. As
illustrated in Figure 2, the service node association and
keying information acquisition is composed of the following
three steps.
4.2.1. Key Space Advertisement. A service node S announces
its existence through beacon broadcasting when its key
space is ready. The beacon message should include: (i) a
Worker node Service node
Select Ks
n = p ×
q








Figure 2: Service sensor association. A worker node associates itself
to a service sensor to obtain the keying information through a
secure channel established based on Rabin’s public cryptosystem.
unique key space id, (ii) the public key n, where n =
p × q and (p, q) is the corresponding private key preloaded
before deployment, and (iii) the coverage area of the service
sensor, which is determined in LKE by a grid size L,
and specified in iPAK and SBK by a forwarding bound
H , the maximum distance in hop count over which the
existence of a key space can be announced. The mes-
sage will be forwarded to all sensors within S’s coverage
area.
4.2.2. Secure Channel Establishment. Any worker node
requesting the keying information from a service node needs
to establish a secure channel to the associated service node.
Recall that we leverage Rabin’s public key cryptosystem [27]
for this purpose. After obtaining the public key n, a worker
sensor picks up a random key Ks and computes En(Ks‖R) =
(Ks‖R)2 mod n, where R is a predefined bit pattern for ambi-
guity resolution in Rabin’s decryption. En(Ks‖R), along with
the location information, is transmitted to the corresponding
service sensor. After Rabin’s decryption, the service sensor
obtains Dp,q(En(Ks‖R)) = Ks‖R, where Ks will be utilized to
protect the keying share transmission from the service sensor
to the work sensor.
Note that in this protocol, each worker sensor executes
one Rabin’s encryption for each service sensor from which an
existence announcement is received, whereas the computa-
tionally intensive decryption of Rabin’s system is performed
only at service sensors. This can conserve the energy of
worker sensors to extend the operation time of the network.
In this aspect, service nodes work as sacrifices to extend the
network lifetime.
4.2.3. Keying Information Acquisition. After a shared key Ks
is established between a worker node and a service node, the
service sensor allocates to the node a keying share from its
key space. The keying information, encrypted with Ks based
on any popular symmetric encryption algorithm (AES, DES,
etc.), is transmitted to the requesting worker node securely.
Any two worker nodes receiving keying information from the
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same service node can derive a shared key for secure data
exchange in the future.
After disseminating the keying information to all worker
sensors in the coverage area, the service sensor should erase all
stored key space information for security enhancement.
4.3. Shared Key Derivation. Two neighboring nodes sharing
at least one key space (having obtained keying information
from at least one common service sensor) can establish a
shared key accordingly. The actual computation procedure
is dependent on the underlying key space model. We refer
the readers for the details to Subsection 3.1. Note that
this procedure involves the exchange of either node ids,
if polynomial-based key space model is utilized [19], or
columns (seeds) of the public matrix, if matrix-based key
space model is utilized [18]. To further improve security,
nonces can be introduced to protect against replay attacks.
5. Service Sensor Election for the In-Situ
Key Establishment Schemes
All the in-situ key establishment schemes rely on service
sensors for keying information dissemination after deploy-
ment. As stated before, the major diﬀerence among the three
schemes lies in how service sensors are selected, which is
sketched in this section.
5.1. iPAK. Service node election in iPAK is trivial. They
are predetermined by the network owner. iPAK considers
a heterogeneous sensor network consisting of two diﬀerent
types of sensors, namely, worker nodes and service nodes.
Since the number of service sensors is expected to be much
smaller than that of the worker sensors, service sensors are
assumed to have much higher capability (computational
power, energy, and so forth) in order to complete the key
bootstrapping procedure before they run out of energy.
Each service node is preloaded with all the necessary
information, including one key space and two large primes.
Worker sensors and service sensors are deployed together,
with the proportion predetermined by ρ, where ρ = λ ·
Ns/Nw, and Ns(Nw) is the number of service nodes (worker
nodes). The serving area of a service node is predetermined
by the forwarding bound T0, the utmost hop distance
from the service node that the keying information can be
disseminated.
5.2. SBK. Compared to iPAK, SBK does not diﬀerentiate
the roles of worker sensors and service sensors before
deployment. Instead, sensors determine their roles after
deployment by probing the local topology of the network.
In SBK, service sensors are elected based on a probability
Ps, which is initialized as Ps = 1/λ. Once elected, a service
sensor constructs a λ-collusion-resistent key space and serves
worker sensors within its coverage area that is determined
by the forwarding bound T0. T0 is defined according to the
expected network density, which should satisfy NT0 ≤ λ










Figure 3: LKE: A virtual grid, with each grid size of L, is computed
based on location information. Sensor u is selected from the
competition area and will take care of key establishment for nodes
residing in the coverage area.
In SBK, the service node election is conducted for
several rounds. At the beginning of each round, a non-
service sensor that does not have any service node within
T0 − 1 hops decides to become a service node with the
probability Ps. If a sensor succeeds in the self-election,
it sets up a key space, announces its status to T0-hop
neighbors after a random delay, and then enters the next
phase for keying information dissemination. Otherwise, it
listens to key space advertisements. Upon receiving any new
key space announcements from a service node that is at
most T0 − 1 hops away, the sensor becomes a worker node,
erases its primes, and enters the next phase for service
sensor association and keying information acquisition. Note
that the reception of a service node announcement also
suppresses sensors who have self-elected as service nodes but
have not broadcasted their decisions to broadcast their status.
If no service node withinT0−1 hops is detected in the current
round, the sensor participates in the next round.
To speed up the key bootstrapping procedure, an
enhanced scheme, iSBK, is also proposed in [13], which
achieves high connectivity in less time by generating more
service sensors. In iSBK, the service sensor election probabil-
ity Ps is initialized as Ps = 1/NT0−1, and is doubled in each
new round until it reaches 1.
5.3. LKE. Similar to SBK, LKE [14] is a self-configuring
key establishment scheme. However, the role diﬀerentiation
is based on location information instead of a probability
Ps. Right after deployment, each sensor positions itself and
computes a virtual grid with the grid size of L. As illustrated
in Figure 3, each grid contains a competition area, the disk
region within a radius of δ from the grid center. At most one
service sensor will be selected from the competition area.
An eligible sensor first waits a random delay. If it
receives no competition message from others, it announces
its decision to be a service sensor. Otherwise, the sensor
self-configures as a worker sensor. Note that all the eligible
sensors are within δ-distance from the grid center with
δ = R/√5, where R is the nominal transmission range. The
setting of δ ensures that all eligible sensors within a grid can
communicate with each other directly.
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Each service sensor will establish a λ-collusion-resistent
key space and serve those worker sensors residing in the
coverage area, the disk region centered at the grid center with
a radius of L. The setting of L satisfies πL2 = λ × A/N ,
where A is the deployment area, and N is the total number of
nodes to be deployed. Thus, each service node is expected to
serve λ nodes in a uniformly distributed network. To improve
performance, iLKE is proposed, which adaptively generates
service nodes based on a hierarchical virtual grid structure
such that each service sensor will serve at most λ worker
sensors.
6. Performance Evaluation
In this section, we study the performance of iPAK, SBK,
and LKE via simulation. Note that we focus on worker
sensors only, as service sensors are sacrifices that will not
participate in the long-lasting networking operations. We
will evaluate the in-situ key establishment schemes in terms
of the following metrics via simulation: Scalability, Resilience,
Connectivity, Storage, and Cost. These performance metrics
will be defined at which our corresponding simulation results
are reported.
6.1. Simulation Settings. We consider a sensor network of
300 or 500 nodes deployed over a field of 100 by 100. The
sensors are uniformly distributed in the network, with each
node capable of a fixed transmission range of 10. All the
results are averaged over 100 runs.
In SBK and LKE, the two system parameters that aﬀect
the performance are the node density and λ, the security
parameter of the λ-collusion-resistant key spaces. In iPAK,
two more system parameters to be specified are ρ and T0,
where ρ determines the fraction of service nodes to be
deployed, and T0 determines the serving area of a service
node. In our simulation study, we measure the performance
of the three schemes under the same node density and
security parameter λ, and conFigure the other parameters
(T0 and ρ) accordingly for a fair comparison.
In iPAK, the serving area of a service sensor is specified
by the preconfigured parameter T0. While in SBK and LKE,
a service sensor determines its coverage area according to
λ and the node density. Specifically, a service sensor serves
worker sensors within T0-hop (in SBK) or L-distance (in
LKE), respectively, where NT0 ≤ λ and πL2 = λ × A/N , T0
is the maximum number satisfying NT ≤ λ and NT is the
average number of neighbors within T hops in the network,
N is the number of sensors in the network, and A is the
deployment area. In the simulation, we select T0 (for SBK
and iPAK) and L (for LKE) that satisfy




Specifically, we consider N = 300 or 500 sensors in the
network, estimate NT , the average number of neighbors
within T-hop using the ER model [12] (see Table 1), decide
the forwarding bound T0 for a given security parameter λ
(see Table 2), and measure the performance accordingly.
Table 1: NT , the number of neighbors within T hops, computed
from ER model, used in Tests 1, 2, and 5.
T 1 2 3 4 5
NT(N = 300) 9 26 55 101 164
NT(N = 500) 16 48 106 194 310
Table 2: T0, the forwarding bound, used in Tests 1 and 2.
λ 50 70 90 110 130 150
T0(N = 300) 2 3 3 4 4 4
T0(N = 500) 2 2 2 3 3 3
Another parameter to be considered in iPAK is ρ, where
ρ = λ × Ns/Nw and Ns(Nw) is the number of service sensors
(worker sensors). iPAK specifies the proportion of the two
diﬀerent sensors before deployment. While in SBK and LKE,
service sensors are elected based on probability or location
after deployment. In SBK, a service sensor is elected with the
probability Ps = 1/λ, with the expectation that each service
sensor serves only λ worker sensors. Thus, Ns/Nw is expected
to be 1/λ in SBK. While in LKE, the network is divided into
grids, and one service sensor is elected from each grid. Hence,
Ns/Nw ≈ (
√
A/L)2/N ≈ A/NL2 = π/λ, where L is the grid
size which satisfies πL2 = λ × A/N . Therefore, we consider
two settings in the simulation: one is to compare iPAK and
SBK with ρ = 1, the other is to compare iPAK and LKE with
ρ = π.
6.2. Comparison on Scalability, Storage, Connectivity and Cost.
Given a series of λ values, we first measure the performance
of iPAK, SBK and LKE in terms of storage, measured by τ,
the number of keying information units (polynomial shares
[19] or crypto shares [18]) obtained by a worker sensor;
connectivity, measured by the key sharing probability P0, the
fraction of communication links that are secured by shared
keys; and cost, measured by the percentage of service nodes
generated [13, 14] or allocated [12] by the in-situ schemes.
We consider a network of 300 or 500 nodes, and employ
the ER model to estimate NT , the number of nodes within
T hops in the network. The derived NT values are given in
Table 1. Then for each given λ, we setT0 which is the maximal
number satisfying NT ≤ λ. The T0 values used in iPAK and
SBK are reported in Table 2. According to the analysis in
Section 6.1, we conduct three experiments: one is to compare
SBK and iPAK, with ρ = 1 in iPAK; one is to compare LKE
and iPAK, with ρ = π in iPAK; one is to compare SBK and
LKE under the same λ and node density. The results are
presented in Figures 4, 5, and 6, respectively.
As illustrated in Figures 4, and 5, SBK and LKE can reach
better connectivity than iPAK. By adjusting the number of
service nodes to be generated, SBK and LKE respond actively
to diﬀerent network conditions with a high key sharing
probability. However, iPAK has no such self-adjustability due
to the predetermined ρ and T0 values. Hence, iPAK requires
that the system parameters should be carefully planned
beforehand for specific network conditions. Nevertheless,






















































































50 70 90 110 130 150
Security parameter (λ)
SBK, N = 300
SBK, N = 500
iSBK, N = 300
iSBK, N = 500
iPAK, N = 300
iPAK, N = 500
(c) Cost
Figure 4: Test 1. iPAK versus SBK (iPAK: ρ = 1, NT0 ≤ λ):




















































































50 70 90 110 130 150
Security parameter (λ)
LKE, N = 300
LKE, N = 500
iLKE, N = 300
iLKE, N = 500
iPAK, N = 300
iPAK, N = 500
(c) Cost
Figure 5: Test 2. iPAK versus LKE (iPAK: ρ = π, NT0 ≤ λ):
Comparison on storage, connectivity, and cost.




















































































50 70 90 110 130 150
Security parameter (λ)
SBK, N = 300
SBK, N = 500
iSBK, N = 300
iSBK, N = 500
LKE, N = 300
LKE, N = 500
iLKE, N = 300
iLKE, N = 500
(c) Cost



























20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200





Figure 7: Test 4. Comparison of In-Situ schemes and Probabilistic-
based Key Predistribution Schemes: Key Sharing Probability vs.
Keying Information Storage.
iPAK has the least on-site operating complexity, since node
role diﬀerentiation and key space construction are already
finished before deployment.
Note that the performance of iPAK can be improved by
choosing the appropriate system parameters. For example,
we set ρ = 1 in Test 1 for a fair comparison between iPAK
and SBK. ρ = 1 indicatesNs/Nw = 1/λ, which is just the lower
bound for the fraction of service sensors to ensure the desired
key-sharing probability under the limitation of NT0 ≤ λ.
Thus, the key-sharing probability of iPAK is low in Figure 4.
However, by selecting ρ = π in Test 2, iPAK can achieve a
much better connectivity with a small increase in the storage
overhead. Hence, we can safely claim that iPAK, as well as
SBK and LKE, can be configured to reach a high connectivity
with a small amount of keying information storage in worker
sensors. By using service nodes as sacrifices, all of the three
in-situ schemes can avoid the storage space wastage that
is existent in all the probabilistic-based key predistribution
schemes, since the keying information is only disseminated
within the close neighborhood.
As illustrated in Figure 6, we also observe that SBK and
LKE behave similarly, while SBK can always burden worker
sensors with similar storage overhead while achieving high
connectivity, which is attributed to SBK’s excellent topology
adaptability. In SBK, sensors diﬀerentiate their roles as either
service nodes or worker nodes after deployment by probing
the local connectivity of the network, and then service
nodes disseminate the keying information according to the
specific network connectivity. But in LKE, a deterministic
procedure based on location information is conducted for
role diﬀerentiation and keying information distribution.
Thereafter, we can expect SBK to perform better than LKE
in adapting to diﬀerent network conditions.
To further study the scalability of the in-situ schemes,
we select LKE to compare with several probabilistic-based
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Figure 8: Test 5. iPAK vs. LKE (iPAK: ρ = π, NT0 ≤ λ). Comparison
on Resilience Against Node Capture Attack.
Table 3: T0, the forwarding bound, used in Test 5.
λ 60 120
T0(N = 300) 3 4
T0(N = 500) 2 3
key predistribution schemes. Figure 7 plots the relationship
between P0 and m, the number of memory units for keying
information storage in a worker node (for a λ-collusion-
resistent key space, m is determined by τ, the number of
keying information units a sensor can obtain in the form of
m = (λ+ 1)×τ for the polynomial-based key space [19], and
m = (λ + 2) × τ for the matrix-based key space [18]) . We
measure LKE’s key sharing probability and compare it with
that of the basic random key predistribution scheme (EG)
[2], the random polynomial-based key space predistribution
scheme (LN) [7] and the random matrix-based key space
predistribution scheme (DDHV) [5]. The settings in EG and
DDHV are the same as those in [6]. In EG, the key pool is of
size 100, 000. In DDHV, we set the security parameter λ = 19
and the key pool size of 241 key spaces. For LN and LKE, both
are considered in a network with 600 nodes, with each node
storing 3 polynomial shares (we select 3 since it is a typical
value for LKE in uniform network distribution as proved in
[14]). The results show that the in-situ scheme can reach
a much higher connectivity than the probabilistic-based
predistribution schemes given the same amount of storage
budget. Since the in-situ key establishment schemes are
purely localized, they can completely remove the randomness
inherent to the key predistribution schemes and hence
achieve a much better scalability.
In summary, all of the three in-situ schemes obtain
high scalability in network size. They can reach high
connectivity with small amount of storage overhead, while
SBK outperforms LKE, LKE outperforms iPAK in terms of
topology adaptability.
6.3. Comparison on Resilience. To evaluate the resilience of
the in-situ schemes, we consider a smart attack where an
adversary compromises all nodes within a disk of radius Ra,
and measure the resilience with the following metric.
6.3.1. Resilience. Given an attack radius Ra, the resilience
against node capture attacks is defined to be the fraction of
the compromised links incident to at least one compromised
sensor among all the compromised links. Note that the
metric resilience is in the range (0, 1], where a value closer
to 1 represents a better resilience.
We consider only iPAK and LKE in our simulation study,
since in SBK there are at most λ worker nodes within a
λ-collusion-resistent key space. Thus, the resilience of SBK
remains to be 1 no matter how many nodes are captured and
no matter what the network topology will be.
In the simulation, we set ρ = π in iPAK to compare with
LKE. T0 (see Table 3) is the maximal number that satisfies
NT ≤ λ, where NT (see Table 1) is evaluated with the ER
model.
As illustrated in Figure 8, both iPAK and LKE can
eﬀectively prevent the leakage of security information about
uncaptured nodes, while iPAK outperforms LKE under the
constraint that NT0 ≤ λ. We also observe that iLKE achieves
the “perfect” security, which allows an adversary to learn
nothing about the uncaptured sensors from those being
directly attacked.
In terms of resilience, iPAK, SBK and LKE perform
diﬀerently since they follow diﬀerent regulations on ns, the
number of keying information to be released in a λ-secure
key space. SBK requires strictly that ns be at most λ, while
iPAK has no such provision at all. In Test 4, the regulation
NT0 ≤ λ indicates that each λ-collusion-resistent key space
is expected to cover no more than λ worker sensors, which
brings about the strong resilience as illustrated in Figure 8.
As for LKE, the improved scheme (iLKE) follows the same
requirement as in SBK, while the basic scheme has no
requirement on ns but defines for each key space a coverage
region that is expected to contain λ nodes in a uniformly
distributed network. Hence, we observe that LKE and iLKE
behave similarly in a uniform network distribution, while
iLKE remains “perfectly” secure and LKE shows a small
fluctuation in resilience. Such a fluctuation is attributed to
the topology that is not perfectly uniform in our simulation.
In summary, SBK and iLKE perform the best in main-
taining the security of the system. LKE can achieve a strong
resilience under uniform network distribution, while iPAK
must set T0 as NT0 ≤ λ to work against node capture attack.
6.4. Discussion on Computation Overhead. From the in-situ
key establishment framework, we know that the computation
overhead of a worker sensor comes from three sources:
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encrypting a shared key ks between a service sensor and itself
in secure channel establishment, decoding the keying infor-
mation obtained from the associated service node in keying
information acquisition, and calculating the pairwise keys
shared with its neighbors in shared key derivation. The first
involves one modular squaring, while the second requires
a symmetric decryption operation. These operations are
repeated for each service sensor with which the worker sensor
associated with.
For each neighbor, a work sensor needs to compute a
pairwise key if they share a common key space. In general,
given the keying information, computing a shared key with
one neighbor takes (λ + 1) modular multiplications for both
key space models. Furthermore, if the matrix-based key
spaces are used and only a seed, instead of the whole column
of the public matrix G, is included as the keying information,
each worker sensor needs (λ + 1) more modular operations
in order to recover the complete matrix share for each key
space.
Modular operations are expensive in terms of energy
consumption and computation time, which could make
our in-situ schemes unapplicable to many practical sensor
network settings. Therefore, we propose to utilize the secure
pseudorandom functions (PRF) defined by the 802.11i
working group and the Wi-Fi Alliance. These PRFs exploit
the computationally light-weight HMAC-SHA-1, with each
incorporating a diﬀerent text string as input [29] to generate
nonoverlapping key spaces. In our case, the text string can
be the ID or the location information of the service node.
Therefore in iPAK, each service node is preloaded with a
PRF while in LKE and SBK, the elected service nodes run
their stored PRFs to generate key spaces containing random
keys. Then the service sensor securely deliver a set of pairwise
keys to each associated worker sensor, as long as the worker
sensor conveys the list of neighbors to the service sensor in
the association phase.
Note that we can treat the PRF as another key space
model, based on which each service sensor generates a ran-
dom key pool that will supply pairwise keys to the associated
worker sensors. It is obvious that no computation is needed
at the worker sensor side. However, this zero computation
overhead does not come for free: each worker sensor needs
to collect the list of neighbors and send this information
to all the associated service sensors. Therefore worker
sensors tradeoﬀ computation overhead with communication
overhead. Furthermore, the λ-collusion resistent advantage is
also lost as the PRF key space does not hold this property.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied iPAK, SBK and LKE, the
three in-situ key establishment schemes proposed recently
for large-scale sensor networks. We also introduce a simple
improvement by exploiting a secure pseudorandom function
to replace the matrix-based or the polynomial key space
such that no computation is needed at the worker sensor
to further conserve the resources. Our simulation results
indicate that all the three in-situ key establishment schemes
achieve high scalability in network size since they are purely
localized. In addition, SBK and LKE outperform iPAK in
terms of topology adaptability, SBK and iLKE have the
best resilience against node capture attack, and iPAK has a
better operating complexity. Our future research includes a
more extensive performance study under diﬀerent topology
conditions and a comparison study with the probabilistic
key predistribution schemes.
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